More Than a Window: A Look at the 2005 Red Sox
I've done a lot of yapping around here about how the Red Sox haven't made a single midseason prospects-for-veteran trade in the past decade, and how that precedent should encourage us to proceed with *extreme caution* as we consider a trade for Roy Halladay today, as it was set by perhaps the best-run franchise in the sport.
Since I had a little time to kill, I thought this deserved a fuller analysis. Let's take a closer look at the Red Sox of 2005, the year after their first World Series victory. Here are the basic facts.
Despite winning a title, going into 2005 the Red Sox had not yet become the juggernaut and model franchise they are today. For one thing, the 2005 Red Sox were freakin' old. Their three best position players were Manny Ramirez (age 33), David Ortiz (age 29), and Jason Varitek (age 33). Pitching-wise, Pedro Martinez signed with the Mets in the 2004-05 offseason, and Curt Schilling suffered through an injury-plagued 5.69 ERA season at age 38. The average age of Boston's starting lineup and its five best starting pitchers (not including Schilling) was 32.
Also, the Red Sox had a good, but not yet elite, farm system. Here's Baseball America's analysis of their farm system as of November 10, 2004. Their top ten prospects were, in order: Hanley Ramirez, Brandon Moss, Jonathan Papelbon, Jon Lester, Anibal Sanchez, Dustin Pedroia, Luis Soto, Kelly Shoppach, Abe Alvarez, and Manny Delcarmen. They also had a young Kevin Youkilis, although he played too much as a part-timer in 2004 to qualify as a "prospect" (99 OPS+ in 248 AB at age 25 in '04).
Finally, on the field, the 2005 Red Sox were a very good, but not dominant, team. While they led the American League in scoring, they had the AL's fourth-worst team ERA. They ended the season with a 95-67 record (.586 winning percentage), and their five-year winning percentage coming into 2005 was .560. (By way of comparison, the Phillies have a .579 winning percentage so far in 2009, and their five-year winning percentage coming into the season was .543.)
Now here's where the comparison breaks down a little: I don't remember if any bigtime pitchers were on the block in July 2005, but none were traded. In any event, the Red Sox made no major trades at the deadline. At the end of the regular season, three teams were tied for the second-best record in the league at 95-67 (Yankees, Red Sox, and Angels). The Red Sox were assigned the wild card slot on a tiebreaker, and played the 99-63 White Sox in the first round. The White Sox swept them out, 3-0. Game 1 was a blowout, but Games 2 and 3 were close ones that basically could have gone either way.
What I observe is that despite having an aging team with real weaknesses going down the stretch, and despite having a fair number of prospects and other young unproven players that had real trade value, the Red Sox didn't panic. There was no sign that they believed they needed to sacrifice the future for the present to take advantage of some "window of opportunity." Instead, they stayed calm and stayed the course. While they lost in the playoffs that year, they lived to fight another day. And as we all know, they eventually went on to win another World Series two years later, and continue to be a franchise that's in great shape for the long term, likely to contend as far as the eye can see. Some of the most crucial contributors on both the 2007 team and the 2009 team include Youkilis, Papelbon, Lester, Pedroia, and Delcarmen.
[Side note: Yes, it's true that the Red Sox later traded away Hanley Ramirez and Anibal Sanchez. However, they did not do so at the trade deadline, but during the offseason when the market is much more sane. They also traded those guys not for an aging veteran who had declared that he was dead set on testing the FA market in the near future, but rather, for a young stud pitcher, Josh Beckett, who hadn't yet even reached his prime years and who was open to signing - and ultimately did sign - a contract extension (not to mention they also got Mike Lowell). It also must be noted that this trade happened during Theo Epstein's brief hiatus from the GM position with the Red Sox. Epstein might not have made that trade himself, and although the Red Sox probably aren't sorry about it today, who's to say that they still wouldn't have won a World Series if instead of Beckett, they'd had Hanley Ramirez with his 145 OPS+ at shortstop in place of Julio Lugo? That lineup would have been downright terrifying.]
So, there are some real parallels here. In 2005, Boston was older than we are in 2009. Their pitching was worse than ours is in 2009. The quality of their farm system was comparable to ours in 2009. It's true that they didn't have the opportunity to go after a Halladay-type in 2005. But let's say they had had that opportunity, and the guy they acquired had then left a year-and-a-half later. Maybe that guy would have brought them a championship during his brief tenure there... but maybe he wouldn't have. What's clear is that despite their advanced age, the Red Sox did not just have a short window of opportunity to win. To the contrary, they were a team on the verge of a very long, extended period of title contention. They acted like they could be good forever, and today, they do, in fact, have a real shot at being good forever. But if they didn't have Papelbon, Lester, or Beckett (who I see as being closer to a continuation of Ramirez the prospect, than to a "cashing in" of Ramirez the prospect, for the reasons mentioned above), that wouldn't be the case.
The typical counterargument to all this is that we can't emulate the Red Sox because they're richer and smarter than we are. But that's kind of a fallacy. Yes, the Red Sox are richer than us, but the margin isn't that huge. In April, Forbes magazine ranked them as the third richest team in MLB, with $269 million in annual revenue. But we weren't that far behind: the Phillies are #7 in MLB, with $216 million in annual revenue. More to the point, while a $53 million difference in revenue is big, what's even bigger is the difference between Boston's competition and our competition. The Yankees have $375 million in annual revenue, but the Mets are more than a hundred million dollars behind them at $261 million. Also, how do you think the Red Sox got to be so rich? It wasn't always thus. While the Phillies will never have the nationwide following Boston has, they can become a much bigger revenue-generator if they have a sustained period of success. The cachet that comes from being a "name" team is quite valuable in terms of merchandising, road gate, and so forth. That gap between us and Boston can close to some degree.
As for whether or not we're smarter than the Red Sox: I'll concede that I think much more highly of Theo Epstein than Ruben Amaro (though Amaro's done some good things in his short time as the man in charge - I do think Ruben's smarter than a lot of other GMs out there who aren't named Theo Epstein). But I think the right way to approach this "problem" of "not being smart enough" is to act smarter and to advocate that the team act smarter, not to intentionally advocate that the team act dumb on the theory that if they don't, then it'll be fated to act even dumber than that down the road.
So all I'm trying to say here is: Don't give up too much for Halladay. We can win titles after 2010-11 if we just act like we want to win titles after 2011. Don't just "go for it." Don't just "git 'ur done" (stupidest, most annoying phrase ever). Either make a trade that's defensible on its own merits irrespective of the time element, or don't make a trade at all. Time is not of the essence. Do not overpay talent out of a misplaced sense of urgency. There is no window.
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Great Article
Wow, very well put together, kudos taco pal I love to see great teams compared to each other. I really do believe that the Phillies have a lasting dominance in the MLB for the next decade! I think what the Red Sox have done with their pitching we have made up for in our hitters. Our hitters are the best in the league, when they are in the same lineup, hands down. As for acquiring a Halladay, Amaro I hope grinds the Jays down to a deal where we do not lose both Happ and Drabek, they very well could be Studs next year. Notice that the Red Sox didnt acquire any big time pitchers at the time and they did not repeat. If the price is right, and we do land Halladay; and Myers come back with a healthy BP and a 2008 Lidge it could very well put us over the top. Keep in mind though REPEAT is extremely difficult. IMO i say if we can budge the Jays for Happ Carrasco Brown and Marson then do it. We still have 3 good pitching prospects for the future, and I think our lineup shouldnt need to change anytime soon. Combine Redsox pitching with Phillies Batting, and you have an unbeatable team. Good Job man
A well-articulated post.
I agree that a trade for Halladay can’t happen “at any cost,” because that’s the kind of stupid logic that gets you two seasons of Erik Bedard and a gutted minor league system. I’m a huge believer in the importance of cost-controlled young players, and as something of a prospect nut, I hate giving guys away for less than fair value.
At the same time, though, there are a couple of things we have to remember. First, 1.5 years of an in-his-prime Roy Halladay — the best pitcher in baseball — is incredible value, and it’s certainly worth giving up a couple of good prospects for. Second, the opposite of giving prospects away, Steve Phillips style, is hoarding them — there’s no guarantee with prospects, as everyone knows. To put it in the terms of this post: sure it would’ve looked bad if the Red Sox dealt Pedroia, Ellsbury, and Lester for, say, Alfonso Soriano (who was available at the trade deadline), but we’re saying that with hindsight. I mean, what were the odds that those guys all became as good as they are now? The flip side: A.J. Burnett was available, too, so what if they’d managed to swing Brandon Moss, Anibal Sanchez, and Kelly Shoppach for Burnett?
Understood. That’s definitely a question worth chewing on. My point in this particular post (despite its wordiness) is a narrow one: that we shouldn’t assume we only have a “window of opportunity” when we make this decision, because that assumption is probably false and will skew our analysis in a bad way.
To address a couple of your points, PF, I think you’re right in saying there was no way to predict in ‘05 that Pedroia, Ellsbury, and Lester would become what they are. However, I do think one could have predicted in ’05 that three unidentified guys on that BA list would turn into a Pedroia, an Ellsbury, and a Lester – even if it wasn’t possible to know which ones. I suppose the right way to look at things is to assume that every blue-chip prospect is the average of Jonathan Papelbon and Brandon Moss. Or that every mid-level prospect is the average of Dustin Pedroia and Luis Soto. (Or something like that.)
Anyway, what bothers me is that it’s almost certainly going to take at least two top-of-the-line prospects to swing a Halladay deal. I know you can’t count on all your prospects to pan out, but if we trade two (or three) very good prospects, the likelihood that at least one of them will turn out to be a very good player is actually pretty high. And even if that player isn’t quite as good as Roy Halladay, he could easily still be worth more than Halladay because of the cost-controlled six years.
Also, while 1.5 years (actually, more like 1.3 years) of Halladay is quite valuable, I think it’s less valuable for us than it might be to a lot of other teams. As I think we might have discussed elsewhere, I strongly subscribe to the school of thought that the playoffs are a crapshoot. Of course, Halladay will still help us there, but not that much. His primary value is in the regular season, for the purpose of getting into the playoffs. But unlike a team like, say, the Cardinals or the 2008 Brewers, we’d only get to enjoy that value for 1.0 years since I think we pretty much have this division locked up already. I don’t want to get caught paying a price commensurate with 1.3 years when we won’t be getting the full benefit for all 1.3 years.
Good post and something else to make note of, the Phillies have the second oldest offensive team AND the second oldest pitching staff (both to the Astros) in all of MLB. These guys are going to start to come down the hill and we are going to need to replace them with young cheap talent.Trading Halladay for Happ makes us even older.
For Who? My teammates.
For What? To Win.
How Much? Where do I sign?
Yes, good point.
I think it’s totally perverse that so many people are looking at our situation where we have a team that’s just starting to get old, and concluding that this means we have to trade our prospects away to get even more older players. That’s basically what the “window of opportunity” argument means in practice.
I agree.
It’s taken a while to get the farm system to the point it’s in now. Except for the turnover of back of the rotation pitchers and relievers, including Happ and Kendrick, I think the last player promoted from the minors was Carlos Ruiz in 2007. There was a productive period obviously from the days of Rolen, Burrell and Wolf up to the current core of Hamels, Howard, Utley and Rollins, but it would be wrong to think that the team can by long without some replenishment from the system. A couple of prospects for Halladay, sure, but your top rookie plus three or four other top-flight prospects seems like too much.
by phillyinportland on Jul 27, 2009 2:44 AM EDT up reply actions
Get Halladay!
Yeah, they shouldn’t give up everything, but if they can get a dominant pitcher and only give up Drabek or Brown (not both), why not? Everyone talks about small sample size here – it’s fun to pick the Red Sox, but how many other teams can you look at that made one run than slipped back? The Red Sox did pick up the dominant pitcher they needed and gave up a lot to get him. The fact that it occurred in the offseason seems irrelevant. Get Halladay and you know you’re in WS contention the next two years. Who knows after that. But the Mets are gonna get it right eventually (these revenue stats were before their new stadium. They are soon going to outspend us even more and you can’t bank on them messing up how they spend every year.) The NL is wide open right now and we could be the clear favorites the next two years.
Read the article more closely before you comment on it, please. As I already explained, the main reason why Beckett is different is that Beckett was young and willing to sign an extension. Halladay is neither. And in any event, Boston didn’t come out clearly ahead on that trade. They might have been just as good, if not better, with Hanley. If that’s your best argument for “picking up the dominant pitcher,” you need to come up with a better one.
The very picture of short-sightedness:
Get Halladay and you know you’re in WS contention the next two years. Who knows after that. But the Mets are gonna get it right eventually (these revenue stats were before their new stadium. They are soon going to outspend us even more and you can’t bank on them messing up how they spend every year.) The NL is wide open right now and we could be the clear favorites the next two years.
1. We’re in World Series contention this year already.
2. “Who knows after that”? I know this – if we gut our minor league system now, we won’t be in World Series contention after a few years.
3. Being the “clear favorites” guarantees nothing. It will increase our odds a bit, but not by that much. The playoffs are a crapshoot.
Again, millions of Americans are drowning in credit card debt, and this is why.
I think you’ve effectively refuted the idea the Phillies’ window doesn’t have to close in the next year or two or three. And I definitely agree with your basic concept —much more importantly, so does the Phillies front-office. But I think it’s possible to overstate the importance of having a good conceptual basis for a front office doing what it’s doing on any one particular transaction. In general, yes, I agree, these teams will do a lot better than teams that rely on flawed concepts. However, doesn’t execution matter just as much in individual transactions?
For example, Ramirez and Sanchez anchored the Beckett trade but apparently the Marlins first wanted Ramirez and Lester, only for Boston to convince the Marlins to take Sanchez and an additional prospect instead. Wouldn’t the trade look a lot different today if Lester had been included? Or if, thus far, Sanchez hadn’t been plagued by injury but Lester had? Isn’t it a) the recognition that Lester is better prospect than Sanchez and b) the circumstances that allowed the Sox to convince the Marlins into accepting Sanchez plus instead of Lester what makes this trade a good one for the Sox?
Similarly, the Phillies apparently don’t want to part with Drabek and Brown. If they convince the Jays to take Taylor and a lesser prospect instead, won’t our evaluation of this trade in four years depend largely on comparing Brown and Taylor?
Yes. I don’t know how much of that is skill and how much of it is luck, though. I don’t know if any organization is capable of consistently identifying only the prospects that will fail – if you trade blue chip prospects frequently, you’re going to get burned on some of them no matter how good your scouts are. You can only try to assign a “present value” to each prospect and go from there.

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