The Ultimate Good Luck: Utley, Howard, Hamels
by dajafi on Feb 16, 2010 5:23 PM EST
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PrintAs the Phillies gear up for the 2010 season, the organization continues to attempt a balancing act between winning it all this year and ensuring chances to compete for championships far into the future. The tension between these objectives fed the series of decisions that saw the Phils swap aces in December, bringing in Roy Halladay from the Blue Jays while sending Cliff Lee to the Mariners. Ken Rosenthal assesses the sequence again in a new piece, concluding that the Phils are "built for the long run"--an assessment we can assume pleased GM Ruben Amaro Jr., who's quoted extensively in the piece.
I'm not really interested in re-litigating the Halladay/Lee moves. I understand the constraints on the team's budget, which would have killed them after this season, facing a stripped rotation without Lee or Joe Blanton; in revenue terms, they just don't have much room to grow right now. (Hopefully someone's working on this, whether that means a dedicated Phillies TV network, having J.A. Happ work kids' birthday parties, or something in between.) But I'm not sure it's as clear as it should be just how crazily fortunate the team is to be in the competitive position in which it finds itself.
The core of this Phillies team came through the draft, which between 1996 and 2002 brought Jimmy Rollins, Pat Burrell, Ryan Madson, Brett Myers, Chase Utley, Ryan Howard and Cole Hamels-all key contributors to the 2008 world champions-into the fold. The last three players remain franchise cornerstones, among the three or four highest-value players from the entirety 2000, 2001 and 2002 drafts respectively. A look at the players selected at the same point in the draft for the five years before and after each was taken shows that the Phils succeeded with those picks not just beyond their own likely expectations, but what even the wildest optimist could have hoped for.
Using Wins Above Replacement (WAR) to evaulate the players drafted in the same slots in the five years before and after the three Phillies, we get a sense of just how fortunate the team was.
Chase Utley
Utley was selected in the first round of the 2000 draft, with the 15th overall pick. Here are the players taken with that pick in the five years before and after his selection:
1995: Red Sox, Andy Yount (never made majors)
1996: Padres, Matt Halloran (never made majors)
1997: White Sox, Jason Dellaero
1998: Pirates, Clint Johnston (never made majors)
1999: White Sox, Jason Stumm (never made majors)
Maybe that was a bad run; of anyone taken in the middle of the first round, you'd expect more than one in five at least to reach the big leagues, and to have heard of any of them. Admittedly, the guys taken at 15 in the five years following Utley did somewhat better.
2001: Blue Jays, Gabe Gross, 6.3 WAR
2002: Mets, Scott Kazmir, 17.9
2003: White Sox, Brian Anderson, -0.4
2004: Diamondbacks, Stephen Drew, 5.6
2005: White Sox, Lance Broadway, 0.6
They all made it, in fact, and Kazmir and Drew are at least borderline stars whose best work still might be in front of them. But in terms of WAR, Utley's 39.7 has more than twice as many as Kazmir's 17.9 to this point, and in fact he's been worth over ten wins more than all ten of his before-and-after draft counterparts combined.
Ryan Howard
Where Utley at least had been a college star whom the Dodgers had tried to take with a high-round pick three years earlier, Howard was considered something of a disappointment in college, and he slid to the fourth round of the 2001 draft where the Phils took him with the 140th overall pick. Given the performance of the guys selected at that spot in the five years previous, expectations should have been modest:
1996: Padres, Brian Loyd (never made majors)
1997: Padres, Tony Lawrence (never made majors)
1998: Reds, Jayson Larman (never made majors)
1999: Cubs, Steve Smyth, -0.6
2000: Angels, Bobby Jenks, 7.2 WAR
Jenks turned out to be a valuable big leaguer... just not for the Angels, who waived him after the 2004 season. If you've heard of any of the other four, that's one up on me. But the five taken at #140 after Howard actually make the "before" group look good:
2002: Tigers, Bo Flowers (never made majors)
2003: Blue Jays, Justin James (never made majors)
2004: Rockies, Matt Macri
2005: Cardinals, Bryan Anderson (never made majors)
2006: Pirates, Patrick Bresnahan (never made majors)
The gap between Howard's Wins Above Replacement (21.9) and that of his ten draft comps is staggering--more than three times their total, which is basically that of Bobby Jenks. To put it another way, the Phillies drafted the best second baseman and the best first baseman in their almost 130 year history in back to back years, at points in the draft where there's much more failure than success. (And recall that four years before they got Utley, they landed Rollins, the best shortstop they've ever had, in the mid-second round.)
Cole Hamels
Compared to Utley and Howard, Hamels almost doesn't look that special. The 2002 draft was famously loaded, with B.J. Upton, Zack Greinke, Prince Fielder, Jeff Francis, the aforementioned Scott Kazmir, Nick Swisher, Joe Blanton and Matt Cain selected among many other big leaguers of somewhat less distinction. But the 17th overall pick, where the Phils took Hamels, had been anything but a guaranteed goldmine over the previous five years:
1997: Red Sox, John Curtise (never made majors)
1998: Astros, Brad Lidge, 11.0
1999: Red Sox, Rick Asadoorian (never made majors)
2000: Dodgers, Ben Diggins, -0.2
2001: White Sox, Kris Honel (never made majors)
Lidge we know was decent; the other four, again, were something less than memorable. How about the "after" group?
2003: Red Sox, David Murphy, 3.6
2004: Dodgers, Scott Elbert, -0.3
2005: Yankees, C.J. Henry (never made majors)
2006: Padres, Matt Antonelli, -0.4
2007: Rangers, Blake Beavan (never made majors)
Thought we were done with C.J. Henry, didn't you? The Yankees took him with the pick they got from the Phils for the Jon Lieber signing, then of course traded him to the Phillies in the nightmarish Bobby Abreu deal. He's now out of baseball. Murphy is a solid major leaguer and Elbert might turn out to be useful; otherwise we again see slim pickings. Murphy's 3.6 career WAR plus Lidge's 11.0 still doesn't quite equal Hamels' 14.7, even before you factor in the negative WARs of Antonelli, Elbert and Diggins.
So that's three draft picks, from three straight drafts, in which the Phillies got almost unimaginably more than they had any right to expect--and, since Utley was a below-market player through 2009 and Howard and Hamels remain short of free agency, they've gotten all that production at a steep discount.
This is good fortune that you can neither plan for nor "earn." To be sure, the Phils did well in developing all three players, despite some bumps and near-disasters along the way (the short-lived Utley-to-third experiment, rumored trades of Utley to Oakland for Mark Mulder and Howard to Pittsburgh for Zach Duke or Kip Wells, Hamels' bar fight, etc). But if anybody knew what those guys would become, obviously they never would have lasted long enough for the Phils to select them. And if the Phils themselves were bulletproof judges of amateur talent, there wouldn't be so many Greg Golsons or Joe Saverys in their recent draft history.
So what does it mean? Obviously, Amaro and his team will continue to do the best they can in evaluating amateur talent; more recent picks like Kyle Drabek, Adrian Cardenas and Michael Taylor have enabled trade acquisitions, and the likes of Trevor May, Jiwan James and Jon Singleton could be the next group of high-risk, high-reward draft pickups. But you can't discount luck, and it's nearly certain that the Phils will never again in our lifetimes have as much of it in as short a period of time as they did through the 2000-2002 amateur drafts. The organization would do well to keep that in mind, lest they become too convinced of their own wisdom and judgment.
(post title with apologies to Richard Ford)
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Awesome piece
Great work dajafi, and this is certainly a resounding argument in favor of having kept Lee (even though you said you didn’t want to relitigate this). The Phillies have a very special window right now, one that comes around once in . . . well, never. They need to continue to capitalize on that.
Thanks. But I’m still not sure that the unique circumstance of draft success that teed up this window means that the smart move was to keep Lee—probably shortening the window but improving the team’s odds for another ring—or do what they did, which was essentially keep Blanton for three years (figuring he would have been dumped if they’d kept Lee for 2010) and hope that they get enough from Aumont, Gillies and Ramirez to boost their chances in the out years.
But right now the Phillies are benefitting from the ultimate good luck. To expect this to consider much longer is hoping too much. They should be capitalizing on what they have now, not hoping to have lightning strike twice in 10 years. Sure, they’ll have to re-build, but I’d rather they do that on the downswing of Howard, Utley, Hamels, Rollins, etc. careers after having won another championship or two than to hold onto those guys on their downsides hoping that a few new prospects will be enough to counter the stars’ slips.
by David S. Cohen on Feb 16, 2010 11:06 PM EST up reply actions
Well, predictably, I totally reject the premise that because the Phillies vastly outperformed their draft slots on three draft picks, we’re now living in some sort of once-in-a-lifetime “window of opportunity.” That premise has huge logical holes in it. I don’t dispute, of course, that the Phillies were, in fact, very lucky on those three picks. But (1) just because we were lucky on three guys doesn’t mean that our team as a whole is so “special”, and (2) just because we were so lucky to draft three guys in 2000-02 doesn’t mean we’re just as lucky to have them now.
The main point is that none of these three guys are in their first three years of service time anymore. They’re all in their arbitration seasons and while they’re all undoubtedly playing for sub-market salaries, we’re not talking about astronomical margins. In fact, BP has their combined MORP for 2010 at approximately $40 million, while in real life they’re going to be paid $40.5 million. While that calculation strikes me as being low (and while MORP is still a pretty crude stat), the point is: now that we’re in 2010, we’re no longer benefiting from our 2000 luck to the same degree that we were in, say, 2006.
Also, we are not the Brewers. The Phillies currently have the third highest payroll in MLB. Given their economic fundamentals, they should continue to field a top-eight-or-so payroll – if not in perpetuity then at least for many seasons to come. In order to win consistently with a payroll like that, all we need to do is keep roughly as much sub-market talent on the team as we have right now.
That isn’t that hard to do. The Phillies don’t have THAT much sub-market talent on their team right now. Yeah, they’re getting very good deals on all their key players besides Lidge and Ibanez. Yet at the same time, they don’t have a single key player in the *really cost-controlled phase of his career (the first three seasons) – J.A. Happ, their fourth-best SP, is the closest thing they’ve got. Developing a steady stream of good-but-not-great players through your farm system (as teams like the Dodgers, Braves, Rockies, Angels, and, more recently, the Rangers have done) can give you just as big of an edge on the market as the Phillies have now. Our budget can buy ourselves an above-average team any time we want, simply by avoiding waste. Getting from above-average to title competitor on a consistent or at least frequent basis might not be easy per se, but it isn’t a herculean task either. It will require basic competence from Amaro and friends, but not lightning strikes or genius level decision-making.
With all due respect, the “window” theory is a WIP creation, and while that doesn’t necessarily mean it’s wrong, it’s pretty suggestive. The reason why so many people find it to be so compelling isn’t because of objective facts, it’s because of the tendency in human nature to want instant gratification. We are all predisposed to want to believe that now is the time, so we believe it much more often than the facts warrant. I just can’t see how the facts could possibly warrant it in this case.
Definitely built for a window
Even Amaro has said as much including how one of his main goals was extending that window with the current level of talent. After 2011, there are going to be some real notable changes on this team and it is likely that a key number of starters (Howard, JRoll, Werth, Ibanez, etc) will be gone. Even if they do manage to keep most of their current talent that will be entering their early-to-mid 30s. 2012 – Wheeze Kids II: Keep Wheezing.
It would be nice if you would actually respond to the points made in a comment when you reply to it. You show no signs of even having read my comment.
Just stating that our current starters will be departing or aging soon does not prove that there is a “window” (i.e. a short-term opportunity that will inevitably “close”). In order for there to be a “window,” you also have to show that the Phillies are unlikely to be able to replace that talent going forward. You can’t show that because it isn’t true. The Phillies have and will continue to have a comparatively large budget. Given that, all we need is above-average player development in order to remain at a highly competitive talent level indefinitely.
Pot calling the kettle black?
You generally do the exact same thing you chastise me for. Dajafi’s point was that the Phils had some incredible luck in that they were able to draft incredibly high-end talent in consecutive years. It is very rare that you draft 2 potential HOF positional players and a frontline starter (No. 1-2) three consecutive years. It is unlikely that Phils will have 3-4 players emerge over the next 2-3 years from their farm system that provided the kind of WAR that Utley, Howard, and Hamels have done.
It is also no sure bet that this team will continue to field a payroll that is among the top 6-7 in the league either. Historically, this ownership group has shown that they are generally somewhat fiscally conservative/risk averse and generally aren’t willing to make an initial outlay unless they likely will recoup that investment from a postseason appearance/solid attendance. It isn’t harder to see this payroll sliding back to 10-12 if they aren’t quite successful (say 85 wins) and their attendance slips to back to more middle-of-the-pack as it historically has done “isn’t a winner.”
I would define their ‘window’ as having a pretty strong likelihood of winning 90+ games and getting to the postseason. Really that is what it is all about because things are generally such a crap shoot when you get to the playoffs anyway. Just need a ticket to play. Certainly no reason to expect that this team will go back to the long string of mediocrity that they endured but you can make a pretty valid case this team’s “window” to be the clear frontrunner in the NL East/annual postseason player after 2011 as Halladay & Utley age and some of their key players are likely gone (Howard, JRoll, Werth, etc).
I honestly think
that since the city of Philadelphia has goten a taste of the Phillies winning, they have sold out every single game. if they keep selling out, people make money, and everyone likes making money. this will most likely influence ownership to continue spending around 140 to 150 (hopefully) mil a year. This probably keeps the glass-stained window open for longer than utley and howard are going to be sticking around for.
Agreed
I haven’t been to a Phillies game in almost 15 years (I’ve been living in North Carolina for ~6 years, so I have never been there since the Bank opened). Even though I loved the Phillies and Eagles, I hated that fetid toilet they played in. It was better to watch the games from home than to sit in an uncomfortable seat, miles from the field and watch Rico Brogna strike out. If CBP had been there 12 years ago, I may have actually gone to watch Rico Brogna strike out, but that park combined with a competitive team should be a license to print money for the owners for years to come.
You generally do the exact same thing you chastise me for.
No, I don’t. Can you cite any examples? I doubt it. I can cite two examples for you: both of your posts in this thread, which were completely non-responsive to my arguments.
It is very rare that you draft 2 potential HOF positional players and a frontline starter (No. 1-2) three consecutive years. It is unlikely that Phils will have 3-4 players emerge over the next 2-3 years from their farm system that provided the kind of WAR that Utley, Howard, and Hamels have done.
Would you read my comment, please? The fact that you drafted Hall of Fame players ceases to be a basis to believe you have a “closing window” once you start paying them market-rate or near-market-rate salaries. Once that happens, the fact that you drafted them no longer matters, as you could just as well have acquired players of the same caliber through other means. In our case, the salaries we’re paying our three guys are sub-market but not hugely so. We don’t need to draft three Hall of Famers again to achieve an equivalent edge on the market.
Historically, this ownership group has shown that they are generally somewhat fiscally conservative/risk averse and generally aren’t willing to make an initial outlay unless they likely will recoup that investment from a postseason appearance/solid attendance.
This describes the behavior of nearly every team in MLB. Historically, this ownership group had a team playing in a decrepit stadium that was generating far less revenue than those of its competitors. That is no longer an issue. Staying in the top tier only requires them to do the same thing their peers are doing.
It isn’t harder to see this payroll sliding back to 10-12 if they aren’t quite successful (say 85 wins) and their attendance slips to back to more middle-of-the-pack as it historically has done "isn’t a winner."
The difference between #7 and #10 is only about 13%. After you get past the Yankees and Red Sox, there’s a lot of bunching. So sure, we could go back down to 10. That won’t materially change our ability to remain competitive indefinitely provided that we continue to have competent personnel management and player development.
Certainly no reason to expect that this team will go back to the long string of mediocrity that they endured but you can make a pretty valid case this team’s "window" to be the clear frontrunner in the NL East/annual postseason player after 2011 as Halladay & Utley age and some of their key players are likely gone (Howard, JRoll, Werth, etc).
Let’s cut the “window” jargon, as I think it’s now obscuring the point more than it’s helping. As I see it, the practical question at hand is whether we’re living in such a unique, singular moment in team history that we need to convert future value into present value even if it means a loss in absolute value. In my view, that course of action would only be justified if we can honestly say that it is likely (not just arguable, i.e. a theory someone could make a “pretty valid case” about) that we’ll cease to be a title competitor after 2011 no matter what we do.
I don’t believe that that’s the case. To stay highly competitive after 2011, all we need is:
1. To not be unlucky – we don’t need good luck, we just need to avoid bad luck
2. Competent front office work – we don’t need them to be geniuses, just to avoid mistakes
3. A desire to remain highly competitive after 2011 instead of assuming that we won’t be and throwing in the towel right now. Obviously, if we decide now that we aren’t going to be competitive in the future, then we’re going to gut our farm system for short-term gain and we won’t be competitive in the future. But that will be because we did it to ourselves with a self-fulfilling prophecy, not because the slide was inevitable.
Is it possible that we’ll get unlucky or stupid and thus stop being a 90-win team in the future? Sure it is, but it’s a long way from being set in stone. Remaining a 90-win team for many years to come is a perfectly reasonable goal. Under those circumstances, it is irrational to behave as if we have to bet everything on the immediate short term.
well put
I really like this:
To stay highly competitive after 2011, all we need is:
1. To not be unlucky – we don’t need good luck, we just need to avoid bad luck
2. Competent front office work – we don’t need them to be geniuses, just to avoid mistakes
3. A desire to remain highly competitive after 2011 instead of assuming that we won’t be and throwing in the towel right now. Obviously, if we decide now that we aren’t going to be competitive in the future, then we’re going to gut our farm system for short-term gain and we won’t be competitive in the future. But that will be because we did it to ourselves with a self-fulfilling prophecy, not because the slide was inevitable.
Is it possible that we’ll get unlucky or stupid and thus stop being a 90-win team in the future? Sure it is, but it’s a long way from being set in stone. Remaining a 90-win team for many years to come is a perfectly reasonable goal. Under those circumstances, it is irrational to behave as if we have to bet everything on the immediate short term.
Let’s take the Cardinals as a model. They’ve been competitive for a decade now, with one losing record (‘07) in that stretch, one championship, a pennant, and seven playoff appearances in all. There’s nobody left from the 2000 Cardinals, who lost in the NLCS to the Mets. (The last guy? Rick Ankiel, who was a pitcher then but an outfielder in 2009.)
Of course, the key to the Cardinals’ success over the last nine years has been Albert Pujols, whom the Cards took in the 13th round of the ‘99 draft; that’s some luck. But two GM regimes now have built around Pujols in a way that should look familiar to Phillies fans: a few really opportunistic trades (Scott Rolen; Cliff Lee), some great scrap-heap salvage work (Chris Carpenter, Ryan Ludwick; Jayson Werth, J.C. Romero) and stability in the dugout (LaRussa; Manuel). They’re still refreshing their talent, with Colby Rasmus in the Dom Brown role, albeit a year or so ahead or Brown’s pace.
The Cardinals actually have less money than we do, so their sustained success should give us cause for optimism that the Phils can stay in the mix for years to come.
One last shot
1. They don’t need to draft “HOF” but they are going to need 3-4 players to develop in the next 2-3 years who have provided the kind of immediate, high impact (WAR) that Utley, Howard, and Hamels have generally contributed. No reason they can’t but certainly no guarantee either.
2. This was a team that even in the mid-80/late-80s remained in the bottom 1/3 of annual payroll even when the Vet wasn’t a “decrepit” stadium. The only real exception from about ’85 until the Thome signing was when they invested some dollars in ’94 and ’95 to resign some of the core of the ’93 team including Daulton and Dystrka. Even then that they were generally only middle of the pack in salary. The old criticism that this team refused to spend money were very apt and deserving.
3. Even the difference between 7-10 this year in payroll will likely be about $15-$17M dollars. Not a overwhelming difference but the difference between the Phils upgrading their bench this offseason and making a couple of bullpen signings.
4. Staying as a team that perennially wins high-80s/low-90s over a several year period is really difficult. Since the inception of the wildcard, the only team teams that have done this are the Indians, Braves, Red Sox, Angels, and the Yanks. Only the Yanks have been won consistency in the high-80s/low-90s.
5. Only players signed in 2012 are Halladay, Utley, Ruiz, Vic, Blanton, and Polanco. Hamels will in his last year of arbitration if he hasn’t been resigned to a long-term contract. It is hard to believe that Utley will provide good value at $15M at age 33 or Halladay at $20M at 35. Polanco also will likely be move than a glorified utility INF at 37. They have plenty of payroll flexibility but they are also going to need some of the “toolsy” prospects like James and Singleton to come through and develop.
In summation, it is more likely that this team won’t annually continue as a high-80s/low-90s in 2012 & 2013. It doesn’t mean they won’t be a possible contender but it is just very difficult to sustain the kind of success you are mentioning for several years.
1. They don’t need to draft "HOF" but they are going to need 3-4 players to develop in the next 2-3 years who have provided the kind of immediate, high impact (WAR) that Utley, Howard, and Hamels have generally contributed.
Why do they need to “develop” these high-impact players? To repeat myself for the third time, the fact that we originally developed Utley, Howard, and Hamels is of limited relevance in 2010 when we are paying them salaries that are only somewhat below-market.
2. This was a team that even in the mid-80/late-80s remained in the bottom 1/3 of annual payroll even when the Vet wasn’t a "decrepit" stadium.
Yeah, this is actually false. Between 1985 (earlier payroll stats available online) and 1988, the Phillies were never once “in the bottom 1/3 of annual payroll.” They were generally in the middle of the pack and in 1988 they were actually sixth in MLB. They did go down to the bottom third in 1989 – the reason why that happened was that the highly-paid 1988 squad stunk it up horribly (it was the worst Phillies team of my lifetime) and so they blew up the team and went with a youth movement. Within the next few years, the Vet had become decrepit.
In any event, the late ‘80s cannot be compared to the current era of baseball economics. Although free agency existed in the late ’80s, few superstars moved around and bidding wars were rare, even after the end of collusion. Free agency didn’t start to resemble what it is today until Bobby Bonilla in 1991. That also happens to be the same year Camden Yards was built – that’s really when the modern era of baseball economics began.
The only real exception from about ’85 until the Thome signing was when they invested some dollars in ’94 and ’95 to resign some of the core of the ’93 team including Daulton and Dystrka. Even then that they were generally only middle of the pack in salary. The old criticism that this team refused to spend money were very apt and deserving.
Irrelevant, seeing as how, by your own admission, the Vet was decrepit during this period.
3. Even the difference between 7-10 this year in payroll will likely be about $15-$17M dollars. Not a overwhelming difference but the difference between the Phils upgrading their bench this offseason and making a couple of bullpen signings.
It certainly is not an overwhelming difference. Also, 10-12 is a low-end figure. The team’s payroll will naturally fluctuate year to year. Sometimes there are strategic reasons for having a lower payroll in a particular year. But the Phillies are unlikely to get to a point anytime soon when their payroll fluctuates around a 10-12 median. Their natural median is 7-8.
4. Staying as a team that perennially wins high-80s/low-90s over a several year period is really difficult. Since the inception of the wildcard, the only team teams that have done this are the Indians, Braves, Red Sox, Angels, and the Yanks. Only the Yanks have been won consistency in the high-80s/low-90s.
So what? First of all, you’re using the wrong criteria. Yes it’s hard for teams to have a perfect record of playoff contention and to completely eliminate down-years. But again, the practical question at hand is whether we are living in such a unique, singular moment in team history that we need to convert future value into present value even if it means a loss in absolute value. Just because you may have an off-year or two in the future doesn’t mean you should sacrifice the future and double down on the here-and-now. The latter course is only rational if it’s likely that you’ll have to go through an all-out, extended rebuilding period in the future.
Second, even if the list of six teams that you came up with were legit, which it isn’t, why are you assuming that six is such a small number? There are at least 10 teams with economic fundamentals that make it nearly impossible for them to stay consistently competitive. But not even you would say that the Phillies fall into that category. Of the remainder, many of them have (or at least have had) stupid front offices (Mets, Cubs, Giants, Astros, Dodgers…). And still others have failed to be consistently competitive because they haven’t tried – instead, they bought into the same rhetoric that you’re selling here and intentionally gutted their farms in order to make short-term runs at one big season. When you say that six recent teams have succeeded at being consistently competitive, what that tells me is that this is a perfectly realistic goal just as long as you’re neither poor nor stupid. The Phillies aren’t poor; whether they’re stupid or not depends largely on the strategy they choose on this issue.
“To repeat myself for the third time, the fact that we originally developed Utley, Howard, and Hamels is of limited relevance in 2010 when we are paying them salaries that are only somewhat below-market.”
For the repeated time, I am not talking about 2010. I am talking about 2012-2013. If the Phils are going to stay at “highly competitive”, they will likely need to have at least 2-3 younger players emerge and be high impact guys (WAR) pretty much right out of the box in the 1st year or two.
“It certainly is not an overwhelming difference. Also, 10-12 is a low-end figure. The team’s payroll will naturally fluctuate year to year. Sometimes there are strategic reasons for having a lower payroll in a particular year. But the Phillies are unlikely to get to a point anytime soon when their payroll fluctuates around a 10-12 median. Their natural median is 7-8.”
It is a notable difference and it is the difference between having 1 really good additional player or 2-3 valuable secondary players. You suggest a ‘natural median’ of 7-8. That makes sense given the relative demographics of the area but it is also hard to see them being able to maximize revenues much at this point beyond what they have done or a notable change in the TV markets in Philly.
“So what? First of all, you’re using the wrong criteria”
So if wins aren’t the criteria to use, what do you use from a fan perspective? Playoff appearances, etc?
“Second, even if the list of six teams that you came up with were legit, which it isn’t, why are you assuming that six is such a small number?:\
Those several teams were the only teams that managed to have 7 straight years (or more) of “highly competitive” teams (averaging high 80/low 90s in wins). Even among those 7 teams, the only one that has remain consistently “highly competitive” year-in, year-out was the Yanks over the past 15 years.
“Instead, they bought into the same rhetoric that you’re selling here and intentionally gutted their farms in order to make short-term runs at one big season.”
When I did I ever advocate that they should completely sell-out for the short-term. I understood some of the reasons why they made the Lee trade even if it was more multifaceted than just the prospects they got. Given all of the younger talent they have traded away over the past 2 years, you could argue that the Phils “sold out” to some degree.
My only point is that it is even if this team enjoys “adequate luck” with a “competent” FO and “a desire to remain highly competitive” it is more likely that in 2012 and 2013 they go back to being a team that might be a contender (low/mid 80s win total) than it is likely they stay a team that wins 90+ games.
"Contender" vs. "Highly competitive"
I would be interested to see what Amaro means by the term “contender” and how you are defining it. I would define the term “contender” as a team that is expected to win in the mid-80s and with some good luck/few breaks is able to get into the playoffs. Think that is what Amaro is referring to also. Basically what the Phils really have been the past 7 years.
Personally, would love to see the Phils set that as a minimum threshold of success. Don’t think it is unrealistic at all to expect the Phils to be able to maintain that level of success.
The difference and I think our whole back-and-forth littered with pot shots (sorry about that) is what exactly it means to be “highly competitive.” Difficult to define what exactly that is but I would define it as a team that expects to win their division & make the playoffs by winning at least 89-90 games. If they don’t make the playoffs, it is viewed as a disappointing season. Any major differences?
OK, so I just saw this.
I think “contender” and “highly competitive” mean basically the same thing. The definition in your last paragraph seems reasonable enough. Obviously, a 90-win team can win 85 wins (or 80 wins, or worse, for that matter) in a given season if they get unlucky. The only way to come close to guaranteeing 90 wins every single year is to always assemble enough talent for a 100+ win team, which isn’t realistic of course.
For the repeated time, I am not talking about 2010. I am talking about 2012-2013. If the Phils are going to stay at "highly competitive", they will likely need to have at least 2-3 younger players emerge and be high impact guys (WAR) pretty much right out of the box in the 1st year or two.
[headdesk] I’m talking about 2012-2013 too! (And 2014 and beyond.) My point is that if we are paying full price for our talent in 2010, then when that talent leaves we can replicate the same talent level through means other than player development. The reason why player development is important is that it allows you to have talent at heavily discounted rates for a certain number of years. Once your young players turn into veterans, the advantage gained by the fact that you originally drafted them is diminished.
As a matter of fact, we are not paying full price for Utley, Howard, and Hamels. We’re probably getting them for 25% off. But we don’t need to develop replacements for Utley, Howard, and Hamels to remain and the same talent level after they leave. For example, if we were to develop one new star (whom we wouldn’t have to pay for three years), then we could replace the other two with market-rate free agents.
So if wins aren’t the criteria to use, what do you use from a fan perspective? Playoff appearances, etc?
You are using the wrong criteria because you are only counting teams that were in playoff contention for “seven straight years.” That is not a reasonable standard when the question at hand is whether the Phillies should act as if they only have a brief “window of opportunity” to compete for a title. Just because you’re likely to have a down-year every once in a while does not mean that you should act that way.
When I did I ever advocate that they should completely sell-out for the short-term.
Well, I guess I was working under the assumption that you had actually read my first comment in this thread before you replied to it – an assumption that I now see was unwarranted. My first comment was a reply to a comment by David C. in which he had stated that “The Phillies have a very special window right now, one that comes around once in . . . well, never,” and that there was a “resounding argument in favor of having kept Lee.” I disputed those statements and argued that the Phillies are not in a “very special window” – the point, of course, being that they shouldn’t feel compelled to do things like place a higher value on one season of Lee than on a group of prospects. Then you replied to my comment and included the directly contradictory subject line “Definitely built for a window.” So pardon me if I presumed you thought the Phillies should follow a short-term strategy, considering that if you didn’t think that, there was no reason for you to dispute my first comment in the first place.
My only point is that it is even if this team enjoys "adequate luck" with a "competent" FO and "a desire to remain highly competitive" it is more likely that in 2012 and 2013 they go back to being a team that might be a contender (low/mid 80s win total) than it is likely they stay a team that wins 90+ games.
More likely under what set of conditions? Again, the whole point of the discussion that kicked off this thread was whether the Phillies should aim to add talent to their 2010 team or to their teams of the future. David thought they prioritize adding talent to 2010. I thought they should just try to maximize talent in a time-neutral manner. If we were to trade Jayson Werth for a top-flight high-minors prospect tomorrow, our odds of being a contender in 2012 and 2013 would increase. If we could go back in time and reverse the Cliff Lee deal, our odds of being a contender in 2012 and 2013 would decrease. My point is that the Phillies can be good now and good later and therefore shouldn’t prioritize one time period over the other. You seem to working under the assumption (whether you realize it or not) that the Phillies have no ability to affect their future talent level with their present decisions. That assumption is not accurate.
“As a matter of fact, we are not paying full price for Utley, Howard, and Hamels. We’re probably getting them for 25% off. But we don’t need to develop replacements for Utley, Howard, and Hamels to remain and the same talent level after they leave. For example, if we were to develop one new star (whom we wouldn’t have to pay for three years), then we could replace the other two with market-rate free agents”
You are assuming then that it is easy to replace this kind of production or even 80-90% of it on the FA market. It maybe difficult/impossible to for several reasons including the lack of talent available at the positions the Phils need, the difficulty in getting FA to coming to Philly, the Phils reluctance to sign FA to longer-term deals especially FA pitchers, etc, Phils reluctance to give up a high compensatory pick, etc.
“You are using the wrong criteria because you are only counting teams that were in playoff contention for "seven straight years." That is not a reasonable standard when the question at hand is whether the Phillies should act as if they only have a brief "window of opportunity" to compete for a title. Just because you’re likely to have a down-year every once in a while does not mean that you should act that way.”
That wasn’t the only point that Dajafi was making in this column and the question has already been played out largely except for what the Phils may do at the trading deadline this year or maybe next offseason. I thought Amaro handled this offseason about as well as could be expected including the Lee/Halladay deal and hopefully strengthening the bench and 3B.
As for your standard of “highly competitive”, I still would like to know what that is. I would say a stretch of at least several years with win total generally in the high 80s/low 90s while appearing in the playoffs most seasons.
“My point is that the Phillies can be good now and good later and therefore shouldn’t prioritize one time period over the other. You seem to working under the assumption (whether you realize it or not) that the Phillies have no ability to affect their future talent level with their present decisions. That assumption is not accurate.”
Of course they can be good now and good later and they have some ability to affect their future talent with present/near-term decisions. Pretty ridiculous to assert otherwise. It is just unlikely that they remain at the previous level of success they have enjoyed from 2007-09 the next several years.
My statement was using your own vague critiera (adequate luck, competent FO, desire to win) and the players they have signed in the intermediate term and stating the odds are much more likely they go back to be a team that wins in the low to mid-80s in 2012 and 2013.
As for 2010, I did and still would argue that the Phils are acting on a “window” by making the Halladay deal and signing Polanco to a 3-year deal instead of looking at cheaper/shorter options.
You are assuming then that it is easy to replace this kind of production or even 80-90% of it on the FA market.
Yes, I think that’s an accurate assumption. YMMV. But you’d be surprised at what $40 million can get you on the open market.
That wasn’t the only point that Dajafi was making in this column and the question has already been played out largely except for what the Phils may do at the trading deadline this year or maybe next offseason.
I have no idea what this sentence means.
As for your standard of "highly competitive", I still would like to know what that is.
I already answered this above.
My statement was using your own vague critiera (adequate luck, competent FO, desire to win) and the players they have signed in the intermediate term and stating the odds are much more likely they go back to be a team that wins in the low to mid-80s in 2012 and 2013.
Well, no, I think that’s wrong. The luck-neutral, intelligence-neutral outcome for a team with a median payroll rank around #7-8 in MLB is not 83 wins.
As for 2010, I did and still would argue that the Phils are acting on a "window" by making the Halladay deal and signing Polanco to a 3-year deal instead of looking at cheaper/shorter options.
This is a confusing sentence. But what you seem to be saying is that we can conclude that the Phillies adopted a short-term strategy this offseason if we only consider the Halladay trade and ignore the Lee trade. First, this is not responsive to any of my comments in this thread, all of which involve normative statements. Second, you can’t just ignore the Lee trade. It was a rather significant transaction.
Well, no, I think that’s wrong. The luck-neutral, intelligence-neutral outcome for a team with a median payroll rank around #7-8 in MLB is not 83 wins.
Since ’96, the number #7-#8 teams by spending have won an average of 84 games (84.3 +/- 9.1 SD). Highest was the ’02 Braves at 101 wins and the lowest was the ’01 Rangers at 73 wins. Only 7 of the 28 possible teams made the playoffs during that time.
“But what you seem to be saying is that we can conclude that the Phillies adopted a short-term strategy this offseason if we only consider the Halladay trade and ignore the Lee trade.
Previously stated that Lee was traded for multifaceted reasons but it wasn’t simply for just prospects. There were other reasons too include their inability to trade Blanton for what they deemed an adequate offer and the need to have the payroll certainty to make other moves this offseason they wanted to make.
“all of which involve normative statements.”
So you essentially are saying that nothing you said in this thread can be proved or disapproved although you have continually looked to assert that your viewpoint is correct?
Since ’96, the number #7-#8 teams by spending have won an average of 84 games (84.3 +/- 9.1 SD).
I said luck-neutral and intelligence-neutral, so just tallying up what has happened historically over a fourteen-year stretch isn’t particularly compelling.
Previously stated that Lee was traded for multifaceted reasons but it wasn’t simply for just prospects.
So? Prospects were one of the most important reasons. Just throwing the word “multifaceted” out there doesn’t give you license to simply ignore that reason altogether (while fully counting the Halladay trade on the other side of the ledger, even though the Halladay deal was also “multifaceted” in that it wasn’t a purely short-term transaction either – the Phillies’ ability to extend Halladay for three-to-five years was a precondition to the trade). Basically, you are cherry-picking facts in a highly misleading way.
So you essentially are saying that nothing you said in this thread can be proved or disapproved although you have continually looked to assert that your viewpoint is correct?
Ugh. Now this is the kind of sophistry that seriously gets on my nerves. My statements were normative in that I was making an argument as to what the Phillies should do. Of course that argument is based on certain factual premises. What the Phillies’ front office actually believes, however, is not one of the factual premises that is relevant to my normative arguments. Did you really not grasp that the first time?
You could come up with a reasonable construct for ‘average luck’ (e.g., players games lost due to injury) but your ‘average intelligence’ would be a very difficult to represent adequately.
There are limitations with the numbers but it is a reasonable ‘rule of thumb’ calculation. You are just being largely argumentative for the sake of being argumentative.
With the revised numbers you ran it puts you at ~86 wins with a pretty wide spread. Right on the threshold of being a ‘contender’ but more often than not leaves you home in Oct.
“So? Prospects were one of the most important reasons. Just throwing the word "multifaceted" out there doesn’t give you license to simply ignore that reason altogether (while fully counting the Halladay trade on the other side of the ledger, even though the Halladay deal was also "multifaceted" in that it wasn’t a purely short-term transaction either – the Phillies’ ability to extend Halladay for three-to-five years was a precondition to the trade). Basically, you are cherry-picking facts in a highly misleading way.”
Didn’t ignore the other reasons you mentioned. If you asked me give you a summary of what Amaro did this offseason, he took a course of moderation between “going all out in 2010” and “focusing on the longer term” with a slight nod to really focusing on the next 2 years. If they weren’t focusing on the current window of opportunity, they don’t make the Halladay trade or the Polanco signing. If they won’t focusing on the longer term, they would have traded Blanton for whatever they could have gotten, kept Lee, and likely have him walk at the end of the year.
“What the Phillies’ front office actually believes, however, is not one of the factual premises that is relevant to my normative arguments. Did you really not grasp that the first time?”
I did ‘grasp’ that. Thanks. Maybe the Phils can do the general things you advocated and stay highly competitive. We just disagree on that slightly and define “contender” and “highly competitive” a bit differently.
If an extremely important factor in your analysis cannot be quantified and you have a sample size of 28, then that means the results of your analysis are not a “reasonable ‘rule of thumb’ calculation.” Pointing that out is not “being largely argumentative for the sake of being argumentative.” It’s just stating a fact.
How do you have any idea if “Front office intelligence” is a important explanatory factor or not especially when you haven’t even defined it?
It is relatively a small sample size and the wide SD reflects that. Going back further than ’96 is problematic though because of the WC and division alignment.
It is not a heuristic and the average win total for that time period (85.75 wins) does give you insight/perspective into what teams who were in the #7/#8 slots were able to achieve. No reason to just dismiss it outright because it doesn’t necessarily support your position.
Since ’96, the number #7-#8 teams by spending have won an average of 84 games (84.3 +/- 9.1 SD).
There’s something else wrong with this analysis. What you’ll find if you run the same calculation for every spot on the payroll ranking from 1-30 is that all the teams will be bunched toward 81 wins in a manner that would be unrealistic for an actual single season’s standings. The fact that something is an average does not necessarily mean that it’s the right number to use in making a spot prediction for the following year.
Phils had a run for several years
Where they nailed a bunch of high draft picks. Some of it was good drafting but there was alot of dumb luck in it too. Since then, they have traded away a ton of their high draft picks (to acquire necessary pieces and additional talent) and made some high draft round picks in 1st/2nd round that already look like busts including Savery, Hewitt, and Collier.
Amaro needs to Gillies to turn into a starting OF and either Aumont/Ramirez to turn in a pitcher who gives the Phils some meaningful innings as a starter or back-end bullpen type pitcher. If not, really being a contender in 2012 is going to be a lot tougher because this minor system isn’t nearly as loaded as people think.
I totally agree that good luck has played a big part in bringing so many star players to this team at this point in time. We should recognize that it will be additional good luck if, five years from now, our current prospects yield an additional handful of star players. It would be unrealistic to expect lightning to strike twice.
Because our good luck has been so unusual, I think we should try to keep our current star players for as long as they remain very productive, a period that may last for the next five years.
Specifically, I would extend Werth as soon as possible and trade Ibanez after 2010. I would extend Howard and let Lidge go after 2011 (That would mean grooming somebody in the organization like Aumont for the closer role or going outside the organization for an inexpensive alternative.). I would also extend Rollins after 2011, and I would trade Victorino after 2011 or let him go after 2012. I’m hoping, of course, that one of Gillies, Gose, James, etc. can replace Victorino.
If we don’t capitalize on our good luck and instead begin letting our star players go, that may begin a descent from the elite to the competitive and eventually to the mediocre.
by Derekcarstairs on Feb 16, 2010 11:36 PM EST reply actions
Revenue enhancers
at the Giles Party Suites, bonus packages:
- For an extra $500, the Phanatic will visit.
- For an extra $1000, Sarge will visit.
- For an extra $1500, Larry Andersen will visit.
- For an extra $2000, Chris Wheeler plus any of the above will visit.
- For an extra $5000, no one will visit.
Welcome back Cliff Lee.
Exceptional...
Thanks dajafi. Loved it. My favorite point:
The organization would do well to keep that in mind, lest they become too convinced of their own wisdom and judgment.
Also nice to see some love from Rosenthal. Klapisch also joins in on some love for Halladay, predicting he could win 22-23 games this year. http://msn.foxsports.com/mlb/story/klapisch-halladay-should-feast-on-nl-021510
Thanks. To be fair to Amaro, he kind of alluded to the role of luck in the Rosenthal piece:
"Lee is likely to sign with a high-payroll club," Amaro says. "If we get that pick, it could be somewhere between 25 and 30. That’s the first pick.
"The second pick could be anywhere down the line to 50, depending upon how many guys are lined up in between in the sandwich area. You’re not looking at slam dunks. You get after the 10th or 15th pick in baseball, you’re kind of rolling the dice . . ."
While I’ve criticized him for what seems like a tendency to under-value draft picks, it’s probably at least as arguable that some of us, me certainly included, at times tend to overvalue them.
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