The Good Phight: FanPosts

Cole Hamels, So Cuttered

2013-05-20T01:52:24Z

That's right, the subject is Cole Hamels, not Roy Halladay, although Doc is not irrelevant to it by any means. Once Doc hangs up his stethoscope and enters the Hall of Fame as a Phillie, the Commissioner who introduces him should remember to credit him for the teammates who benefited by his example. Kyle Kendrick, as pretty nearly everyone seems aware, is one of these. Another, in at least one regard, is probably Cole Hamels. When Doc arrived in Philly during the 2009-10 off-season, Hamels was coming off a difficult season and was ripe for, if not reinvention, then at least an enlarging of his capacity as a pitcher. As he has since acknowledged, he first took serious note of the cut fastball, or cutter, during Cliff Lee's first brief stay with Phillies in 2009. We all remember how that stay worked out, but the example of Lee's success with the pitch stuck. And then Halladay arrived. Doc had been in the process of partially reinventing himself as a pitcher for a number of years at that point by giving the cut fastball an ever larger place in his pitching repertoire (2004-2.5%; 2005-7.5%; 2006-19.3%; 2007-25.2%; 2008-33.2%; 2009-41.5%), as the two-seam sinking fastball receded as his primary pitch. It's unclear who actually taught Hamels the cutter -- Steve Carlton, Cliff Lee, and former closer John Wetteland have all been credited with providing input -- but it's not a stretch to say that Halladay's arrival catalyzed Hamels' decision to adopt it.

The cutter is essentially a four-seam fastball gripped off-center, with pressure applied to the spin-side finger. Although some pitchers throw a somewhat slower version with the addition of some wrist pronation, the true cutter is several MPH off fastball speed with a fastball release. The spin produced is meant to result in a late break that is less than that of a slider with more lateral and less dipping movement. This open-source graphic of a Roy Halladay cutter (opens in a new window) illustrates the eccentric release and resulting spin very nicely.

Mariano Rivera, from whom Halladay has been said to have learned his version, will ride the cutter into the Hall of Fame and is often credited with making the pitch fashionable. But in recent years a number of nay-sayers have complained about pitchers' "falling in love" with the pitch, neglecting their fastball, and in fact losing speed on their fastball as a result. There is no doubt that the measure of a cutter, as with any other pitch, is in the ability to control it and to use it appropriately. Kyle Kendrick had a significant lack of success in using the cutter as a replacement for an equally unsuccessful slider to remedy his inability to get left-hand batters out. There's nothing magical about the pitch for pitchers who throw it too predictably or simply don't throw it well enough.

2009 was not quite the disaster for Hamels that it was popularly portrayed as being. A slow start, a sore elbow early in the season, an ugly looking 4.32 season ERA, and a less-than-stellar World Series made it easy for critics to label the season a failure. Hamels himself played into the narrative by admitting that making the rubber chicken circuit after his and the team's magnificent 2008 World Series performance cut into his off-season conditioning. His much misunderstood comment about wishing he could wipe the season out before he had even finished it put an exclamation point on "failure." In fact, Hamels' FIP, xFIP, and SIERA, as Schmenkman recently pointed out, were all pretty much in line with 2008 numbers, and a career-high BABIP of .317 points to a certain amount of bad luck. Still, the 2010 season was ripe for change. Hamels has admitted that up to that point he was pretty much a two-pitch pitcher. In 2009, he had used his curveball a career low 10.5% of the time (10.1% by Pitch f/x). Never more than a mediocre pitch for him, the curve graded out at -1.5 by Fangraphs linear weighting per 100 pitches (in this case representing runs lost above average), and this figure doesn't account for the -4.23 value attributed to his "slider," a pitch Hamels probably did not even throw. Although Hamels' fastball velocity was in fact up in 2009 by comparison to 2008, it too graded out in minus territory.

The cutter is said to be a relatively easy pitch to learn, but mastering how to control it and how to use it took Hamels some time. A comparison of heat maps from 2010 and 2011 against left-hand batters shows his progress in both regards.

Notice how Hamels discovers how he wants to use the pitch against LHB's and how he centers on the location: in on the hands or on the trademark by pounding the inside part of the plate and, equally so, the inner off-the-plate zone from the hands downward, an area previously reserved almost exclusively for the fastball. In 2011 Hamels occasionally also used cutters away to left-handers (not often), something he barely attempted at all in 2010. Even a brief glance at these heatmaps of cutters to right-hand batters shows that they served a somewhat different function -- several functions, in fact.

One was to paint the outside part of the plate with pitches that look like outside fastballs, but broke in on corners. The other was to provide additional inward cutting movement to deceive the eye on trajectory within the zone. Notable about the distribution of pitches on the 2010 map (if you allow for the many more pitches to RHBs) is a diagonal pattern from top right to lower left similar to the one on the map for lefties. The 2011 map shows a pitcher much more confident in his ability to move the pitch around, even the dreaded "down-and-in" to opposite-handed batters. One thing Hamels has seldom done with the pitch, however, is bust it in on the hands of right-handers. For that, Hamels trusts only his fastball. Prior to 2010, Cliff Lee likewise favored his fastball to go inside to right-handers; from 2010 onward he has used fastball and cutter about equally for that purpose. This heatmap shows Roy Halladay's cutters in 2011. Halladay throws his cutter inside to same-handed batters much more readily than Hamels does.

Bill Baer documented at the end of the 2010 season the improvement in both location and result in the cutters Hamels threw in the second part of the season, including the playoffs, by comparison to those in the first. Of 23 cutters put in play, exactly one was a line drive. So 2011 didn't come out of nowhere; it was the culmination of a process that was ongoing through the first season when Hamels actually threw the pitch.

2010, the year Hamels adopted the cutter, was more successful than 2009. ERA, FIP, xFIP, and SIERA were personal bests to that point. Hamels' K rate entered one-strikeout-per-nine territory for the first time. A little-noticed positive, however, was a line-drive rate (16.7%) well below any previous year's, combined with a career-best batting-average-against of .194 by left-handers. These stats may be a smoking gun for the impact of his expanded repertoire. BIS and Pitch f/x have been sharply divergent on use of the fastball vs the cutter in all years since Hamels began using the latter, with Pitch f/x generally crediting more four-seam fastballs and (6-9%) fewer cutters, so citing absolute percentages is of questionable value. Hamels' cutter may have come slightly or significantly at the expense of his fastball in 2010, but both trackers agree that his already-declining resort to the curve diminished considerably by comparison to, say, 2008 (by about 5.5%), and in 2011 it was clearly the cutter that produced a 7-9% diminution in four-seamers. The effect seems to have been salutary. Although K and whiff rates on the fastball in 2010 rose only modestly (about 1%), balls-in-play dropped a significant 2.4%, about the same for left- and right-handed batters. Without a previous year for comparison, it's hard to gauge the success of the cutter for Hamels in 2010 or to be sure how much of his overall improvement can be attributed to the expansion of his pitch selection. What can be said is that 2011 continued to show advancement both overall and in the cutter itself as a pitch. K% rose another 5% for the cutter, and two of every three now registered a strike. The pitch value per 100 pitches jumped by a rate (-.49 > 2.27) that mirrored a similar jump in the value of the change-up (.77 > 3.73).

2011 was such a great year for Hamels that 2012 was bound to show some fall-off. Based on 2011, some prognosticators had Hamels pegged as a Cy Young dark horse. That didn't happen, largely because of a .35 point higher BABIP and a modest falloff in effectiveness against right-handers -- who, after all, make up about 70% of the hitters Hamels faces in an average season. However, Hamels was still very good in 2012. And no, his fastball velocity did not fall off appreciably, nor did he show signs of "falling in love" with his cutter. He used the cutter 2.5-3% less, in fact, and threw notably more change-ups than in either of the previous two years. Both adjustments look very like the actions of a pitcher trying not to become over-reliant on his cutter. An ominous stat, though, was an 8.5% higher LD% against right-handers. The cutter generated a lower whiff rate (5.7%, down from 9.2% in 2011), but whether or why it was otherwise a less successful pitch than in the previous year is hard to say. This heat map by comparison to those for 2010 and 2011 against RHB (shown earlier), may or may not suggest a tendency to be more in the strike zone with a (therefore) more hittable pitch. Clearly, though, batters don't have to worry about being jammed.

2013 has been a struggle for Hamels, not simply in getting wins, but in lack of consistency. Why? Well, for one thing he is throwing too many balls and too few strikes. Hamels' K/b ratio has always been around 2/1. This year he's thrown 58% as many balls as strikes. When he does throw strikes, they're getting hit more. Contact (per BIS) in the zone is at an all-time high (85.2% vs career 82.0%) even while pitches in the zone are at an all-time low (42.3% vs Career 50.1%), although the second is a career-long trend. Unfavorable counts have been particularly problematic. Below are Fangraph wOBA's for 2011, 2012, and 2013 in four unfavorable counts.

*Counts*	2013	2012	2011
*2-0*	.587	.341	.343
*3-1*	.463	.429	.347
*3-0*	.829	.538	.495
*2-1*	.325	.296	.235

2013, not good. The lion's share of the damage is being done by right-hand batters, which, unfortunately, are what Cole will see many more of. It's interesting to note that Hamels had a lower FIP and xFIP against right-handers from 2008-2010. Since that time, the reverse has been the case.

Has the cutter figured disproportionately in the 2013 scuffle? The Missanelli crowd seems to think so. That's not an easy issue to resolve, particularly since BIS and Pitch f/x have very different takes on the frequency with which Hamels has thrown the pitch. They are pretty close to one another for 2013. BIS has the pitch being thrown at a rate (17.9%) below 2011 (20.7%) and 2012 (18.2%) levels, with an increase of fastballs taking up the slack. Pitch f/x has the pitch rate of cutters at 17.3%, but sees that, relative to the last 3 years (8.6%, 12.1%, 9.1%, respectively), as an all-time high. So is 17% a high figure for Hamels or isn't it? Curveballs meanwhile stand at an all-time low. To the eye, there's a good reason for that, although Pitch f/x surprisingly rates the pitch as generally effective. Fastball and cutter are both rated in negative territory per 100 pitches, with the 4-seamer grading out worse. Velocity of the cutter has shown a slight, but probably insignificant decline the last two years, but swings-and-misses are actually considerably higher than in 2012 (10.7% vs 6.4%) and slightly higher than in 2011 (9.4%) If there is any difference between 2012 and 2013 4-seamers, it's perhaps a tendency to be more up-and-in and less up-and-away with the pitch. However, cutter and fastball are not the only place to look for an explanation of the anomalous 2013. Hamels' change-up has been thrown for strikes almost 10% less than in 2011 and 2012 and has generated around 7% fewer swings. Either the pitch itself is less deceptive or hitters are expecting it more and showing more selectivity.

Adaptation and reinvention are an ongoing process. Whether 2011 was a high-water mark for success with the cutter or whether more recent times simply point to a need to get more comfortable with the pitch's best rate and range of uses remains to be seen. 17% of a pitcher's pitches being cutters doesn't sound like a disproportionate figure. Roy Halladay crossed the 17% Rubicon a long time ago, but unlike Hamels, Doc has been de-emphasizing his fastball and has only recently embraced the change-up. If I were to wish anything for Hamels' continuing development, it is a greater mastery of the curveball. Whether that is realistic for a pitcher who has been throwing it as long as Hamels has, well . . . .

Something is clearly up with Hamels, though.

*Counts*	2013	2012	2011
*2-0*	.587	.341	.343
*3-1*	.463	.429	.347
*3-0*	.829	.538	.495
*2-1*	.325	.296	.235

Something is clearly up with Hamels, though.

The Kyle Kendrick Question

2013-05-13T14:52:18Z

There is little argument that Kendrick has been one of the most mystifying and frustrating players on the Phillies since he came up in 2007. He has had many roles from a promising rookie, to a middle reliever, to a long man, to a 5th starter, to minor leaguer, to rotation anchor. The last role is the reason we are interested in Kendrick right now. He has been the Phillies best and most consistent pitcher to this point. He is not the best pitcher on the staff as both Cliff Lee and Cole Hamels have better stuff and track records, Kendrick has been the most consistent starter on the staff. And so we come to the biggest question where do we go from here.

Is This Legitimate?

Yes, this is one of the rare instances where a player has completely changed their profile. When Kendrick came up to the majors he was fastball, slider, changeup and all were kind of average pitches. At some point he lost feel for the slider and was purely fastball changeup. At this point Kendrick was essentially walking and striking out no one and everything was in play. The first big change came in 2010 where Kendrick revamped his slider as a cutter and got more downward movement on his fastball turning it into a real sinker. Over the next two years Kendrick became over reliant on the cutter and it became a real weakness at times. In 2012, Kendrick broke camp with a newly reworked changeup and over the course of the year he became less reliant on the cutter and became more sinker/changeup. About the time he moved to the starting rotation Kendrick had nearly doubled the amount of changeups thrown and cut the cutter use in half. At this point his fastball has average to slightly below velocity but good downward groundball generating movement, his changeup is a plus pitch that misses bats, and the cutter is a third pitch that helps give him a different look.

In addition to the raw stuff Kendrick has adhered to the number 1 rule for right handed pitchers without premium velocity, he has not walked batters. In the second half of 2012 he had a 2.2 BB/9 and in 2013 he has lowered that to 1.6 BB/9. The use of the changeup has allowed him to keep the walk rate down but also bring his strikeout rate above 6 K/9 almost two strikeouts about his career average. For the most part because of the sinker Kendrick has kept the homerun rate down as well. Any pitcher who walks almost no one, generates ground balls, strikes out a decent number of batters, and keeps it in the ball park is going to have continued success.

So What is it Going to Cost:

Kendrick has just over 4 years of service time currently and will hit free agency after the 2014 season. He was Super Two so he will has been arb eligible 4 times, however two of those years were covered by a much ridiculed contract for 2yr $7.5 million. Given his current $4.5 million salary Kendrick should make about 8-9 million before hitting free agency at age 29.

The closest comparables to hit free agency are probably Edwin Jackson and Kyle Lohse. They both got $13 mil/yr on different length deals. Given inflation expect Kendricks contract to be anywhere from 12-15 mil a year depending on the market and any qualifying offer. Given that he will be 29 it is likely that the deal will be at least 4 yrs. So lets conservatively call it the Edwin Jackson contract at 4yrs $52 million.

What to do?

Trade Him:

If you are going to trade Kendrick, the best time is this summer where a team will be paying for a year and a half of service. This should net a prospect in the back end of the Top 100 and possibly a another fringe piece. The value might be higher than anyone on the team and could give you a legitimate piece for rebuilding (not a building block but at least a regular somewhere). Additionally, between Jonathan Pettibone, Adam Morgan, Ethan Martin, and Jesse Biddle you should have a rotation replacement ready by at least summer 2014.

Ride It Out and Give the Qualifying Offer:

If you aren't sure on Kendrick but don't want to lose his pitching value you hang onto him into free agency. If his value stays the same it is likely prudent to give him a qualifying offer to get draft pick compensation. Going this route means you will likely have to pay market rate for Kendrick but you get the longest time to evaluate before making a decision. The problem with this route is that if he continues to improve you might lose him for just draft pick compensation (his value now is more than that).

Sign him to an Extension:

The facts tell us that Kendrick has made real improvements and he has been durable over his career. It might be best to sign him to a 5 year extension (1 arb + 4 FA) that will give him a larger raise in 2014 then he would expect to receive and lessen the burden over the remaining years. The hope is that you get a deal much more favorable than risking free agency. The problem of course is that you chose wrong and you now have another large contract on your hands. Kendrick is young enough that while you will be locking up some decline years you will still be buying very productive years of service.

The big question is, do you cash in your biggest chip now or do you hold on to him with the hopes that he helps build the core of your next contending team.

Is This Legitimate?

So What is it Going to Cost:

What to do?

Trade Him:

Ride It Out and Give the Qualifying Offer:

Sign him to an Extension:

The big question is, do you cash in your biggest chip now or do you hold on to him with the hopes that he helps build the core of your next contending team.

How Do You Phillies?

2013-05-03T16:25:33Z

I was driving last night during the Phillies game so I listened to the whole game on the radio, something I normally only do for weekday games. It really reminded me how calming baseball on the radio is for me. Growing up, I took in Phillies games almost exclusively on the radio or in person (my parents had a rule that we couldn't watch TV during the week) and I really grew to love listening to all sports on the radio, but especially baseball.

I'm an out of town fan now, living in DC, so I subscribe to MLB.tv and watch most games via the app on my iPad or on my AppleTV, but still take in the radio broadcast often if I'm out walking around during a game or weekday games (at work). I definitely watch the games if I can because I love watching baseball and, obviously, being able to see the game is generally preferable to only listening on the radio, but I don't feel the same attachment to watching the Phils on TV as I do to listening to them on the radio. Some of this can definitely be chalked up to the two current crews (Franzke and LA > TMac, Wheels, and Sarge, who I promise I don't hate even though they're annoying sometimes), and some of it can definitely be chalked up to "the way it was" when I was growing up, but so much about baseball on the radio is calming and enjoyable.

It seems like at least a couple of the Blog Lords listen on the radio fairly regularly (at least judging by the recaps, including Trev's great one from last night). When one of the Blog Lords does listen on the radio, I particularly enjoy their recaps (I enjoy them all though, I promise!). I don't really have a good reason why, but I sense that it could stem from the added enjoyment (and yet frustration) that comes with listening to the game on the radio.

How do y'all take in the Phillies? The community here has this incredible mix of statistical outlook on baseball, romantic appreciation for when things go just right, cynicism with the way the Phils are run, and amazing knowledge of history, art, poetry, literature, music, and all other things under the sun. So I'm curious what our mix of mediums is for taking in the games we obsess over.

Value of a Pitcher

2013-04-28T21:06:11Z

The value of a player is much debated fact but there are some things that are often lost in the discussion. Here I am going to try and show the distinctions between different types of pitchers and how they are valuable to a team.

To make this comparison I am going to use three measurement tools here WAR, the 20-80 scale, and the player "role". The idea of WAR is to provide a direct comparison between players, and assess their value to a team. The 20-80 scale is to provide distinct categories between different types of players and direct correlation to their minor league ceilings. The same is true of the "role", this is often the most confusing because the majority of media will describe a player incorrectly. The important thing is that these can change at a moments and while I will describe these as distinct categories it is really a bell curve and there is a rapidly decreasing number of players at the high end.

Starters:

The biggest thing to remember is that these starter distinctions have nothing to do with where they pitch in a major league rotation. There are definitions of the pitches and tools a pitcher must have to fit these designations, but I will pass on these for now.

#1 Starter (80-75) - Synonymous with ace, much like superstar this is an earned designation. Even within this category there are sharp designations at times

WAR projection - 6+ wins

#2 Starter (70-65) - Often #2 starters are confused with aces, they often have a great profile, but one thing that makes you pause and say if only something was a little bit better. If this is an outcome for a pitcher it is a gigantic developmental success for the organization. To best illustrate this distinction the 3 pitchers that toe the line between #1 and #2 starter for me are Zach Grienke, Cole Hamels, and Matt Cain.

WAR projection - 4-6 wins

#3 Starter (60-55) - The majority of opening starters were #3 starters. A #3 starter is not an average pitcher, rather it is an above average outcome. The going rate for a #3 starter is $11-$15 million a year. This is a very broad category of starter with many different definitions but ultimately a #3 starter is something that you want in your rotation.

WAR projection - 2-4 wins

#4 Starter (50) - Most rotations are comprised of #4 starters, and it is a major league average player. There is an acknowledgement with a #4 starter that they are not dominant but

WAR projection - 1-2 wins

#5 Starter (45) - Ultimately their best quality is that they can pitch multiple innings on the major league level. That in itself is a very valuable thing as the average middle reliever is normally a worst pitcher than the starter.

WAR projection - Hopefully greater than 0

Relievers:

Relief pitchers range from fungible to very valuable. It is important to realize that value is relative. Most good relievers will be worth less than 2 wins a year, and many will be worth close to 0. However, there has to be a realization that a middle reliever is a replacement level player so anyone brought up is below replacement level for the most part. A really good closer who can deliver dominant innings and especially a high strikeout rate can be worth as much as 3 wins a year, and while this is less than many #3 starters it is much more than a poor reliever can give you with those same innings.

What This Means:

The gap between a #1 starter and a #2 starter is as almost as large as the gap between a slightly above average starter and a replacement level player. This is the same between a #2 and #3. Aces are incredibly valuable players.

If a player has a #2 ceiling that is incredibly valuable and if your farm system can produce that it is incredible

Same thing for #3 starters, no prospect writer is insulting a player when they say he is a #3 starter. A rotation of #3 starters won't carry you to playoffs but if your 4th and 5th starter are #3 starters your team is going to be really good

A #5 starter is better than a middle reliever and those innings are very useful

Relievers are often said to be fungible because they have a high turnover rate but 0 WAR is better than negative wins

It is all about marginal value, the difference between player value is the value not the overall value

Starters:

#1 Starter (80-75) - Synonymous with ace, much like superstar this is an earned designation. Even within this category there are sharp designations at times

WAR projection - 6+ wins

WAR projection - 4-6 wins

WAR projection - 2-4 wins

#4 Starter (50) - Most rotations are comprised of #4 starters, and it is a major league average player. There is an acknowledgement with a #4 starter that they are not dominant but

WAR projection - 1-2 wins

WAR projection - Hopefully greater than 0

Relievers:

What This Means:

If a player has a #2 ceiling that is incredibly valuable and if your farm system can produce that it is incredible

A #5 starter is better than a middle reliever and those innings are very useful

Relievers are often said to be fungible because they have a high turnover rate but 0 WAR is better than negative wins

It is all about marginal value, the difference between player value is the value not the overall value

Jonathan Papelbon is losing velocity

2013-04-13T15:52:28Z

When the Phillies signed Papelbon to a 4-year, $50 million contract, I think we all felt slightly uneasy. Papelbon would be nearly 35 years old when the contract ended, 36 if his 2016 option vested. And what about all those young, high-upside relievers we had stashed in the minors? But we (or at least I) reassured ourselves. At least we were getting arguably one of the top five closers in the game.

Well, here we are, in only the second year of the contract, and already we find ourselves with a deteriorating Papelbon. Here are his average fastball velocities from 2007 to today (all stats from FanGraphs):

2007- 94.5 mph (26 years old)

2008- 94.9 mph

2009- 94.5 mph

2010- 94.8 mph

2011- 94.8 mph

2012- 93.8 mph

2013- 91.8 mph (32 years old)

It's true that we are only a few games into the season, but it's hard to ignore the trend downwards. To put Papelbon's decline in another way: in 2011, Papelbon had an average FB velocity of at least 95 mph in 36 of his 63 appearances. In 2012, that number sank to 4 in 70 appearances. Papelbon hasn't come close to 95 mph in 2013, topping out at 92.7 mph.

Of course, none of this matters as long as Papelbon is pitching effectively. And last year, he performed just about as well as he always has. But it appears that Papelbon may have compensated for his diminishing velocity last year by throwing more two-seam fastballs. In 2012 alone, Papelbon threw what FanGraphs classifies as a two-seamer 325 times, 29% of his total pitches. Between 2007 and 2011, Papelbon threw a two-seamer a mere 149 times. That's a huge increase, though it's probable that he simply put different movement on his fastball. It's also impossible to tell whether the increase in two-seamers directly contribued to Papelbon's relative success last season.

In conclusion, Papelbon is losing velocity and may begin to lose effectiveness this season. So far this season, in fact, he's posted the highest FIP of his career. He's throwing a slightly different fastball than he was earlier in his career, but it probably won't matter if his velocity continues to drop. He might not have a terrible 2013, but it's definitely something to pay attention to as Papelbon hits the third, fourth and possibly fifth year of his contract.

2007- 94.5 mph (26 years old)

2008- 94.9 mph

2009- 94.5 mph

2010- 94.8 mph

2011- 94.8 mph

2012- 93.8 mph

2013- 91.8 mph (32 years old)

The Anatomy of a Bullpen

2013-04-11T21:38:20Z

After the piece about bullpen mismanagement sparked a commentary about Jeremy Horst and lefty/righty splits and relievers I thought I would write a followup piece on the anatomy of a bullpen and the type of pitchers you find there.

The Pitches:

Fastball: This includes straight 4-seamers, 2-seamers (downward and armside movement), sinkers (think 2-seamers with much more downward movement), and cutters (sharp slider break at a higher velocity and with smaller overall movement). The fastball isn't all about velocity (though it helps) there is also movement and command that matter. Major league hitters can hit fastballs of any velocity it they are straight so movement is a big deal and you need to be able to throw it for strikes, and if you can control where it is a strike even better.

Breaking Ball: In this day and age breaking balls tend to be limited to curveballs and sliders, though occasionally a pitcher will use a cutter as a breaking ball (also can be used as a changeup). Both sliders and curveballs will break away from a same handed batter making them a weapon against those hitters. The key to a breaking ball is the movement, ideally it has two plane break meaning it is moving horizontally and vertically (sliders that just break horizontally will be crushed repeatedly by opposite handed hitters). Also important is that you look the same throwing it as you do throwing your fastball, late and sharp movement is also encouraged.

Changeup: The changeup is a pitch that looks like a fastball but isn't. This includes every grip and movement of changeup as well as splitters (split finger fastball) and sometimes cutters. The goal of the changeup is to fool a hitter who thinks it is a fastball, and they are at their most effective against opposite handed hitters. Depending on the type of changeupit movement will be different, a splitter will have big downward movement as will a split finger changeup. A circle change (Hamel's changeup) will have slight sharp down and armside movement. Some changeups have no movement but the velocity difference to the fastball can still fool hitters.

How you end up in a bullpen:

We often generalize relievers as failed starters. Often this is the case, but in reality there is a different skill set needed to relieve than start. Here are some specific problems that could lead to a pitcher being made a reliever.

Health Concerns: Pitchers are injury prone by the nature of their craft (throwing a ball overhand is one of the most unnatural movements we do) but some pitchers are more injury prone than others. This can be due to preexisting wear and tear on their bodies, violent mechanics that will eventually lead to injury, or anything else that will contribute to a team being concerned there is only a limited number of pitches in their arm.

Large Platoon Splits: Part of being a starter is that you have to go through a whole lineup multiple times and you are on the schedule for a day. If you can't handle a lineup of opposite handed batters you aren't going to succeed in the rotation. This can be due to delivery (the lower the arm angle the better the view opposite handed batters have of the ball out of the hand and the more deception you have against same handed batters), lack of a pitch we will get to that later, or another point of deception that makes you susceptible to opposite handed batters.

Lack of Stuff: You can read this as lack of fastball velocity. Often pitchers will get 1-3 mph boost in fastball velocity out of the bullpen which can make a fringy fastball usable enough to set up better secondary pitches. Even if your secondary pitches are elite you need a fastball to keep hitters honest.

Lack of a Third Pitch: To be a successful starter you need 3 pitches (there are some exceptions but they are few and far between). This has to do with going through a lineup multiple times giving hitters different looks as well as not have huge platoon splits due to the lack of breaking ball or changeup. In the bullpen a pitcher often shortens to two pitches and their is less of a worry about that development.

Mechanics/Control: These two are often linked because the reason that the control is bad is often that the mechanics fall apart over time. In the bullpen you can pull a guy quickly if they fall apart and they need to get through less batters before they fall to pieces.

Need: Big league club need can sometimes cause a starter to be moved up in a high leverage bullpen role. Sometimes they can be transitioned out of the role (David Price, Adam Wainwright) and sometimes they dominate and you can never get them back out (Papelbon, Feliz, Chapman).

Lack of Size: This may not be the best thing the industry does but there is a bias against short pitchers. The first reason is there is a fear they won't hold up under heavy workloads. The second is the lack of plane on their fastball. A 6' 6" pitcher is going to get a lot more downward angle on their fastball than a 5' 10" pitcher, and that difference can make the larger pitcher more difficult to hit and generate more ground balls, while making the smaller pitcher more home run prone.

Bullpen Roles:

Let me start by saying I think the Save and Hold stats have done more to hurt the game than any other stat is baseball; wins, RBI, and runs are mostly harmless, whereas the save not only determines bullpen usage but is determined by bullpen usage, meaning that a guy is a closer because he is a closer. But, for the lack of other terminology I am going to use closer and setup guy to mean the two best relievers in the bullpen. I am going to try and use Phillies major and minor leaguers as examples.

Closer: This is purely my definition but a closer needs to have at least either two plus (60) pitches or an average (50) pitch and a plus plus (70) pitch, though if you have a truly dominating 80 pitch (Rivera's cutter) you can survive on that. On top of that need at least average command and plus makeup. I do think there is a "closer mentality" there are just a lot more guys with it then we give credit for. The mentality is one that is a little insane where you think you are invincible and dominating, and then you also to have a short enough memory that you don't get thrown off by a bad outing.

Major League Example: Papelbon - Plus fastball and plus splitter (does have a slider and changeup as well) and plus control to go along with being slightly insane on the mound.

Minor League Example: Kenny Giles - Plus plus to elite fastball that sits 97-99 touching 100 along with an average slider. Still in A-ball working on the command and is a real competitor on the mound

Setup: Missing just one part of that closer profile (maybe just a 60 and 50 pitch or the command isn't there). Still a dominating reliever and often still has "closer makeup".

Major League Example: Phillippe Aumont - Not in that role right now but he has a 70 fastball and 70 curveball (and a mostly shelved 60 splitter), but the command just isn't there to be a closer right now.

Minor League Example: Justin De Fratus - De Fratus has a fastball and slider that are plus to just below with control that is also in the same range.

Middle Reliever: There are some definitely flaws to this pitcher but he can get batter of both sides out pretty well, may show some platoon splits but isn't exposed against opposite handed pitching. Can give you 1-2 innings but shouldn't be counted on in high leverage situations but shouldn't kill you in any game. Utlimately fairly fungible.

Major League Example: Horst - Three pitch mix of fringy to average pitches means no platoon splits. Knows how to use them and can get you multiple innings if you need.

Minor League Example: Too many to list - Every team has a host of guys in the minors who could be middle relievers.

Long Man: This is a dying breed of pitchers. They can also be your #6 starter. This is a guy who can pitch 3-4 innings in a game at a moments notice and won't kill you during them. Often this is a guy who couldn't get through a major league lineup the second time but is just fine the first time through. You never like to see them in a game but you are always glad to have them.

Major League Example - Kyle Kendrick - Before he developed a changeup Kendrick could not make it through a line up multiple times, but he could give you up 6 innings on a moments notice. He was going to give up a run here and there but it wasn't instant death.

Minor League Example - No team is truly brave enough to make this a true role, but there a players out there who would dominate in it.

Righty Specialist: Not a requirement due to the large numbers of right handed pitchers already in a bullpen but this is a guy who devastates right handed hitting but should never face a lefty.

Major League Example: 2009-2010 Brad Lidge - Slider was there when the fastball left and he could still get righties to chase.

Lefty Specialist (LOOGY): There to get the tough lefties out and should never face right handed batting because of gigantic platoon splits.

Major League Example: Antonio Bastardo - He is severely overqualified here because he can get righties but he has LOOGY stuff.

Minor League Example: Jake Diekman - Side arm LHP whose fastball is 94-96 and higher with a good slider. His delivery could really give him problems against righties, but should destroy lefties, still has control issues.

Mop Up Man: Should never pitch in a game closer than 5 runs. Greatest attribute is they can pitch innings. Often the last guy in the pen under the disguise of long man. Normally a veteran of another role or a fringy starter. Hopefully they are cheap.

Major League Example: Chad Durbin

Minor League Example: Tyler Cloyd

Summary:

We often fall into the trap that relievers are fungible pieces or they are overly valuable. The truth is in between and like many baseball players they are much more effective when used to their strengths. Some teams will overmanage their bullpens with specialists and others will lock players into arbitrary roles they aren't suited for. Teams that manage their bullpens well can exceed expectations and those that don't can lose in agonizing ways. Ultimately the bullpen should be a way to take a flawed baseball player and turn them into a valuable piece in a puzzle